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I’M STILL DANCING: THE CONTINUED EFFICACY  
OF FIRST AMENDMENT PRECEDENT AND VALUES  
FOR NEW-SCHOOL REGULATION 
Dawn Carla Nunziato∗ 
This symposium provides an occasion to reflect on the meaning of 
two foundational First Amendment decisions: New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan1 — “an occasion for dancing in the streets”2 — which im-
posed limits on public officials’ recovery for defamation,3 and New 
York Times Co. v. United States,4 which reaffirmed the central First 
Amendment principle against prior restraints.5  Professor Jack Balkin 
characterizes these decisions as responses to “old-school speech regula-
tion . . . [in which] the state had used penalties and injunctions di-
rected at speakers and publishers in order to control and discipline 
their speech.”6  But, Balkin observes, changes in the infrastructure and 
technology of free expression and in the regulation of speech have sig-
nificantly weakened the impact of these decisions.7  He claims that 
“new-school” speech regulation — government exercise of informal 
control over and co-optation of privately-owned digital infrastructure 
providers — is not meaningfully subject to these precedents: “[T]he 
impact of these two decisions has been weakened by significant chang-
es in the practices and technologies of free expression . . . .”8  Balkin 
expresses particular concern about the inefficacy of the prior restraint 
doctrine in circumstances of collateral censorship, in which the gov-
ernment encourages private intermediaries like ISPs to censor the 
speech of others.9  Such instances of collateral censorship, he worries, 
will effect an end run around the traditional procedural safeguards 
imposed on prior restraints.10  Balkin also expresses concern about the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
∗ Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  My thanks to James Chap-
man for excellent research assistance on this Response. 
1 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 2 Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
3 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283.  
4 403 U.S 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
5 Id. at 714. 
6 Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2298 
(2014). 
7 Id. at 2342.  
8 Id. at 2296. 
9 See id. at 2298, 2308–11. 
10 See id. at 2318.  
  
368 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 127:367 
 
government’s co-optation of private infrastructure providers, through 
which the government informally pressures these entities to restrict us-
ers’ privacy and freedom of expression.11 
In this Response, I contend first that the prior restraint doctrine re-
inforced by the Court in New York Times Co. v. United States is still 
effective in holding in check new-school regulation — at least outside 
the national security context — as evidenced by cases such as Center 
for Democracy and Technology v. Pappert.12  Second, I argue, Balkin’s 
concerns about government co-optation of private infrastructure pro-
viders should be partially allayed by steps these providers have taken 
to expose efforts by the government to co-opt them and to commit 
themselves to upholding First Amendment principles and to transpar-
ency and visibility in responding to government requests to censor con-
tent or reveal user information. 
Balkin writes that, in new-school regulation, governments seek to 
implement collateral censorship, in which they censor speech not by 
their own hands but by incentivizing private intermediaries like ISPs, 
which the government may threaten with criminal sanctions for non-
compliance.13  In such cases, ISPs have the incentive to overblock us-
ers’ speech and may not be held accountable for overblocking because 
they are not state actors.14  But in the case of Pappert, which involved 
precisely this sort of new-school regulation and collateral censorship, 
the state’s indirect efforts to censor were held subject to — and defi-
cient under — the prior restraint doctrine.15  This case involved a 
Pennsylvania law requiring ISPs to block or take down content on or 
accessible through their servers, upon receipt of an ex parte judicial 
order, upon submission by the attorney general that there was proba-
ble cause that the specified content contained child pornography, or 
upon receipt of an informal notice from the attorney general that the 
specified content contained child pornography.16  If the ISP failed to 
quickly take down such content, it would be held criminally liable.17 
Despite the informal nature of the requests, and despite the fact 
that private entities were charged with taking down the content, the 
court found that the law embodied an unconstitutional prior restraint, 
in part because the law failed to provide the requisite procedural pro-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 See id. at 2298–99. 
 12 337 F. Supp. 2d 606 (2004). 
 13 See Balkin, supra note 6, at 2298. 
 14 Id. at 2309.  
 15 Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 611, 656–58. 
 16 Id. at 619, 622–24; see also PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7626 (West 2003), invalidated by 
Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606. 
 17 Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 619 (noting that violators faced fines up to $30,000 and a prison 
term of up to seven years). 
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tections.18  The law was held to be deficient because a judge was only 
required to make a finding of probable cause that the content con-
tained child pornography, ex parte, with no requirement that content 
provider receive notice or have the opportunity to be heard by the 
court.19  Notwithstanding the fact that the law allowed for informal 
notices requesting voluntary compliance, the court held that this 
scheme was still subject to constitutional scrutiny.20  Similar to the in-
formal requests found unconstitutional in Bantam Books v. Sullivan,21 
the informal notices in Pappert were held subject to — and deficient 
under — the prior restraint doctrine.22  Pappert and cases like it23 thus 
suggest that the prior restraint doctrine is still effective in holding in 
check the government’s power to restrict speech in the context of new-
school regulation24 — at least in contexts other than national security. 
 Balkin is also concerned with government co-optation of private 
free speech infrastructure providers and about informal, nontranspar-
ent government regulation of these entities.25  Yet there is substantial 
evidence that these entities are resisting government co-optation and 
acting to increase visibility and transparency in the context of new-
school regulation.  Several leading Internet infrastructure providers — 
including Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!, and Facebook — have also pub-
licly committed themselves to respecting First Amendment values, as I 
discuss below. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 Id. at 611, 656–58. 
 19 Id. at 656–58.  
 20 Id. at 660. 
 21 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
 22 Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 660. 
 23 See, e.g., Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun Cnty. Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 
568–70 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding an unconstitutional prior restraint where a public library imple-
mented filtering software to block patrons’ access to child pornography, obscenity, and content 
deemed “harmful to juveniles,” where such filtering scheme lacked the requisite procedural safe-
guards); see also, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (law conditioning 
federal subsidies for public libraries on their implementation of filters to block harmful content 
did not impose unconstitutional prior restraint or unconstitutional condition on spending, in part 
because the libraries were required to remove such filters upon request from adult patrons). 
 24 Moreover, the prior restraint doctrine has become an influential force within other countries 
as well, many of which had not formerly adopted a version of this doctrine.  The European Court 
of Human Rights is actively borrowing from this and other First Amendment doctrines.  In the 
case of Yildirim v. Turkey, for example, which involved collateral censorship, the court found a 
violation of European Convention of Human Rights Article 10 when Turkey blocked all of 
Google Sites in order to block one anti-Turkish Google Sites website.  Yildirim v. Turkey, App. 
No. 3111-10 at 20 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 18, 2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/ 
pages/search.aspx?i=001-115705.  Judge Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque expressly referred to prior 
restraint jurisprudence, explaining: “To borrow the words of Bantam Books, Inc., any prior re-
straint on expression on the Internet comes to me with a heavy presumption against its Conven-
tion validity.”  Id. at 31 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., concurring). 
 25 See Balkin, supra note 6, at 2323–29. 
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First, the leading Internet infrastructure providers have fought to 
resist government efforts to render them complicit in the surveillance 
of Internet users.  In 2013, Google, Microsoft, Facebook, and Yahoo! 
filed suit in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) arguing 
that, under the prior restraint doctrine, government efforts to prohibit 
them from disclosing their policies regarding NSA requests for and 
FISC-ordered disclosures of user information were unconstitutional.26  
They argued that, based on the First Amendment’s presumption 
against prior restraints, they should not be prohibited from releasing 
information regarding their responses to NSA requests.  In addition, 
they argued that making such information available was necessary for 
them to respond to allegations that they were complicit in the govern-
ment surveillance.27  In January, the providers reached a settlement 
with the Justice Department, permitting disclosure of some of the in-
formation at issue.28  These challenges brought by many (though not 
all) of the major infrastructure providers to increase the transparency 
and visibility of government regulation and resist co-optation give us 
reason to be optimistic about the continued efficacy of the prior re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 Larry Seltzer, Microsoft, Google, Facebook and Yahoo! File Motions in FISA Court, 
ZDNET (Sept. 9, 2013, 3:17 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/microsoft-google-facebook-and-yahoo-
file-motions-in-fisa-court-7000020439/, archived at http://perma.cc/7E3J-FPWV; Brad Smith, Re-
sponding to Government Legal Demands for Consumer Data, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (July 
16, 2013, 1:08 PM), http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2013/07/16/ 
responding-to-government-legal-demands-for-customer-data.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
L5PF-X9TE. 
 27 Ewen MacAskill, Yahoo Files Lawsuit Against NSA Over User Data Requests, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 9, 2013, 4:09 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/09/yahoo-lawsuit-nsa-
surveillance-requests, archived at http://perma.cc/R5G-LJKE; see also Amended Motion for De-
claratory Judgment, In re Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.’s First 
Amendment Right to Publish Information About FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-03 (FISA Ct. Sept. 9, 
2013), available at http://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/google_fisc_motion_sep9_2013.pdf; Mi-
crosoft Corporation’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment or Other Appropriate Relief Authorizing 
Disclosure of Aggregate Data Regarding Any FISA Orders It Has Received, In re Motion to Dis-
close Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, No. Misc. 13-04 (FISA Ct. June 19, 2013), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/misc-13-04-motion.pdf; Yahoo!’s Motion for De-
claratory Judgement [sic] to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders and Directives, In 
re Motion for Declaratory Judgment to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders and Di-
rectives, No. 13-05 (FISA Ct. Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/ 
fisc/misc-13-05-motion-130909.pdf; In re Motion for Declaratory Judgment to Disclose Aggregate 
Data Regarding FISA Orders and Directives, No. 13-06 (FISA Ct. Sept. 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/misc-13-06-motion-130909.pdf (Facebook’s motion).  
 28 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Joint Statement by Attorney General Eric Holder and Direc-
tor of National Intelligence James Clapper on New Reporting Methods for National Security Or-
ders (Jan. 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9YBU-5Y2G (describing settlement in which in-
frastructure providers were permitted to release “the number of national security orders and 
requests issued to communications providers, and the number of customer accounts targeted un-
der those orders and requests including the underlying legal authorities”).  
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straint and other First Amendment doctrines in the era of new-school 
regulation.29 
Second, the leading infrastructure providers — including Google, 
Microsoft, Yahoo!, and Facebook — have publicly committed them-
selves to upholding First Amendment values.  These entities have 
joined the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder or-
ganization whose members formally commit themselves to “respect 
and protect the freedom of expression rights of their users when con-
fronted with government demands, laws and regulations to suppress 
freedom of expression, remove content or otherwise limit access to in-
formation and ideas.”30  Further, they have agreed to be independently 
assessed regarding their compliance with these commitments.31  This 
independent assessment process focuses on national security related 
surveillance requests, government requests for user information, block-
ing and filtering requirements, and takedown requests received by the-
se entities, to determine whether they have complied with the free 
speech and privacy principles to which they have publicly commit-
ted.32  The results of the first independent assessments of GNI found-
ing members Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! were released in Janu-
ary.33 
These free speech infrastructure providers have further committed 
to transparency and visibility regarding government censorship and 
surveillance requests by releasing transparency reports.  Google, Mi-
crosoft, Yahoo!, and Facebook, as well as Twitter, publicly release de-
tailed transparency reports setting forth the government requests they 
have received and how they respond to such requests.34  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 Although the challenges brought by Google, Microsoft, Facebook, and Yahoo! are encourag-
ing from a First Amendment perspective, it bears noting that none of the telephony providers im-
plicated in the NSA mass surveillance program haves challenged NSA requests.  See, e.g., Brian 
Fung, U.S. Phone Companies Never Once Challenged NSA Data Requests, WASH. POST (Sept. 
18, 2013, 9:15 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/18/u-s-phone-
companies-never-once-challenged-nsa-data-requests/, archived at http://perma.cc/9HGH-8EAT. 
 30 GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, PRINCIPLES ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND 
PRIVACY 2 (footnote omitted), available at http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/ 
files/GNI_-_Principles_1_.pdf. 
 31 GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, PUBLIC REPORT ON THE INDEPENDENT 
ASSESSMENT PROCESS FOR GOOGLE, MICROSOFT, AND YAHOO 3 (Jan. 2014), available at 
http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI%20Assessments%20Public%20Report.pdf 
(describing independent assessment process by KPMG, PwC, and Foley Hoag). 
 32 See id. 
 33 See id. at 3–4 (executive summary). 
 34 See Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/ (last visit-
ed June 9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7WXM-YXKW; Law Enforcement Requests Report, 
MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/reporting/transparency/ 
(last visited June 9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LBZ5-L7Y4 ; Transparency Report Over-
view, YAHOO!, https://transparency.yahoo.com/ (last visited June 9, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7W6K-FUCA; Global Government Requests Report, FACEBOOK, 
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In summary, the prior restraint doctrine — at least outside of the 
national security context — is still effective in holding in check gov-
ernment efforts to restrict speech.  And recent actions by the entities 
responsible for the Internet’s free speech infrastructure have trended 
toward transparency and against co-optation by the government.  The-
se developments give us reason to be optimistic about the continued 
relevance of First Amendment precedent and values in the era of new-
school regulation.  So I’m still dancing. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
https://www.facebook.com/about/government_requests (last visited June 9, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/TT8C-TVT2; Transparency Report, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com/ 
(last visited June 9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/77AP-NXPJ.  
